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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In spite  of  signiﬁcant  policy  interest  in improving  the integration  of  health  and  social  care  services,  little  is
known  about  the  economics  of coordination  across  the two  sectors.  We  specify  a Markov  queuing  model
and use data collected  from  administrative  records  to  estimate  the  link  between  two  proxy  indicators
of  across-sector  complexity  of discharge  arrangements  and  post-operative  length  of  stay  in  hospital
for  older  people  undergoing  hip  replacements.  The  results  suggest  that  the  number of local  authorities
involved  in care  planning  and  commissioning  of social  care  services  for discharges  from  a given  hospital  is
signiﬁcantly  positively  correlated  with  longer  post-operative  lengths  of  stay.  A particularly  strong  effect
is  found  between  variability  through  time  in  the number  of  authorities  involved  in  discharges  from a
given  hospital  and  lengths  of  stay.  The  results  suggest  that  improving  information  systems  and  joint
assessment  processes  used  during  the  discharge  of patients  with  social  care  needs  is  likely  to  achieveeywords:
ntegration
elayed discharge
oordination
ength of stay
urvival
ocial care
signiﬁcant  efﬁciency  gains  in  the  health  care  system  as a  whole.
© 2018  The  Author(s).  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).. Introduction
Like many health care systems, the National Health Service
NHS) in England faces considerable ﬁnancial and resource chal-
enges. There is concern that the current policy of protecting the
evel of real government expenditure on the NHS relies on achiev-
ng efﬁciency savings of at least 3% a year. These are substantial
fﬁciency goals, given that over the 15 years prior to 2010, NHS
roductivity growth, upon which these efﬁciency gains are based,
veraged less than 0.5% per annum. Indeed, one set of commenta-
ors estimated that NHS productivity fell by almost 1% in 2012/13
 We are grateful to participants at a health and social care seminar at the LSE, July
015, two anonymous reviewers and to Andrew Street for their useful suggestions.
ll remaining errors are our own.
 This paper is based on independent research commissioned and funded by
he  NIHR Policy Research Programme from the Economics of Social and Health Care
esearch Unit. The views expressed in the publication are those of the authors and
ot  necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR, the Department of Health, arm’s length
odies or other government departments.
∗ Corresponding author.
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.02.005
167-6296/© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articl
.0/).and 2013/14, thus suggesting that a reliance on efﬁciency savings to
release resources to meet growing service demand promises a bleak
future (Health Foundation, 2015). Hospitals in particular are feel-
ing the constraints, with 66% returning ﬁnancial deﬁcits over the
ﬁnancial year 2015/16 and 51% estimated to be in ﬁnancial deﬁcit
in 2016/17 despite central government relief. A major policy initia-
tive associated with these efﬁciency savings is centered around an
increase in the integration of care across the health care and social
care systems.
A key aim of the drive towards integration has been to improve
the management of hospital case throughput. As a result, the iden-
tiﬁcation of patients ready to be discharged and facing a delay
because of a lack of available support facilities on discharge has
become a major concern. The UK National Accounts Committee
estimates that the total number of hospital bed days attributable
to delays in the discharge process, which are recorded through a
monthly census, is approximately 2.7 million per year, resulting in
a cost of £820 million to the NHS (House of Commons Committee
of Public Accounts, 2016). It is suggested that current estimated
delays represent an underestimate of the true ﬁgure, as they are
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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ased on time from clinical assessment, and as hospital capacity is
tretched these assessments are themselves subject to delay.
As Fig. 1 shows, a signiﬁcant proportion of delayed discharges
n the NHS over the analysis period were linked to a lack of support
utside of the hospital. Since 2014, the delays for those awaiting
are outside hospital has increased further, and now account for
pproximately 45% of all acute and non-acute delayed discharges.
In an attempt to address this particular issue, the UK govern-
ent introduced the Better Care Fund (BCF) in 2015, a funding
echanism for incentivizing improved coordination of care com-
issioning across the health and social care sectors. Under the
CF, NHS resources have been earmarked for supporting better
ntegration between the NHS and Local Authorities (LAs) social ser-
ices departments, the latter being responsible for supporting large
umbers of high-need patients following their hospital discharge.
urrent levels of expenditure associated with the BCF are £3.8 bil-
ion (for the year 2016). While this is a signiﬁcant amount, almost £2
illion is in fact not new resource, but a transfer from the NHS bud-
et to the LA’s budget. Moreover, this funding aimed at improving
he integration and coordination of health and social care is being
ntroduced at a time when the social services expenditure on adult
ervices, managed by LAs, has fallen by 10% in real terms since 2010.
Delayed discharge amongst the elderly is seen as a particularly
rucial and complex issue, with over 85% of delayed discharges
ncurred by those aged 65 and older (National Audit Commission,
016). NHS England, the body responsible for managing the health
are system in England, recommends the implementation of 22
rocesses to optimise the transition from hospital to the social care
ystem. These emphasise system-level processes for care coordi-
ation, including regular meetings between local health and social
are service managers, the agreement of roles and responsibilities
f care sector providers in the local economy, ongoing monitoring
f existing pressures, and the pooling of resources to reduce organ-
sational divisions. At a more practical level, it is recommended
hat joint local protocols and assessment forms, secure communica-
ion methods, up-to-date directories of services and single points of
ccess and named contacts are developed. The UK Public Accounts
ommittee (PAC) has highlighted that despite a “good understand-
ng of good practice in discharging older patients from hospital”, the
ake-up of key processes for patient information sharing and coor-
ination between hospitals and LAs is not widespread (National
udit Commission, 2016). For example, less than 50% of hospitals
ave developed joint or shared patient assessments between health
nd social service providers (op. cite., p14–p15).
While there is a relatively substantial literature on the eco-
omics of long-term care (see Fernandez et al., 2011; Grabowski
t al., 2012; Norton, 2000; Pestieau and Ponthiere, 2012; Siciliani,
013 for reviews), there is less formal analysis addressing the
mpact of delayed hospital discharges. Picone et al. (2003) study
he interaction between length of stay and discharge destination for
edicare patients. In the UK, Forder (2009) looks at the substitution
etween expenditure on care homes and hospital expenditure, and
ernandez and Forder (2008) ﬁnd a lower rate of delayed discharges
nd lower emergency readmission rates in geographic areas where
here is more home care and nursing and residential care beds.
aughin et al. (2015) found that delayed discharges in England were
educed by the availability of care home beds. In all cases however,
he quantiﬁed substitution effects were relatively small.
To provide some further institutional background, the 192 NHS
ospitals in England are paid ﬁxed DRG-type prices for the provi-
ion of care for a given population covered by one of the 202 Health
are Commissioning Groups (CCGs), who receive their budget from
ublic ﬁnances raised through taxation. Discharged patients requir-
ng social care receive this through the 152 English LAs who provide
dult social care through community-based and institutional care
n nursing and residential homes, funded by a combination of local Economics 61 (2018) 233–243
and central taxation and user charges at the point of use. Con-
cerns over delayed discharges led to the Community Care (Delayed
Discharges) Act (HM Government, 2003) and further funding sup-
port, as noted above, within the Health and Social Care Act (HM
Government, 2012).
Both Acts oblige LAs and hospitals to coordinate patient
discharges from hospital. Hospital patients are only formally dis-
charged from hospital once their condition is stable and they can be
safely transferred out of the hospital. Until then, a hospital doctor
remains responsible for their care. Once deemed medically ﬁt, NHS
patients are only to be discharged once they have an assessment of
the support needed to be discharged safely, they are given a writ-
ten care plan setting out the support required to meet the assessed
needs, and assurances are taken that the support in the care plan has
been put in place and it is safe for the patient to be discharged. As
shown in Fig. 1, delays with patients’ discharge assessments and the
lack of care outside of hospital account for approximately one ﬁfth
and two thirds of all delays in a given year. Discharge policies vary
across hospitals, and deﬁne amongst other things how patients,
carers and professionals are involved in the discharge planning.
In England, social care provision is means-tested and this process
usually involves a ﬁnancial assessment of the charges that might
be levied from patients for social care services. Approximately 60%
of social care users in England pay for services using their own
resources, while those on low income are subsidised (Fernandez
et al., 2011). LAs are responsible for commissioning any necessary
care, and must reimburse hospitals for delayed discharges that they
are wholly responsible for.
In the NHS, inefﬁciencies in the discharge process associated
with problems of coordination between health and social care have
been discussed in terms of “delayed transfers of care”, or DTOCs.
Their quantiﬁcation, however, has proved challenging and is the
subject of much debate. An important criticism of DTOC indica-
tors is that they rely on a subjective assessment that a patient is
“ready to be discharged”, and this assessment reﬂects differences
in clinical and discharge practices across hospitals and between
professionals. Whether a patient is seen as ready to be discharged
can also reﬂect other factors, most importantly the quantity and
quality of health and social care services available post-discharge,
which creates a potential endogeneity problem in models examin-
ing the interrelationship between the measurement of DTOCs and
hospital and social care exchanges. The indicators also potentially
reﬂect the ﬁnancial position of a hospital trust, as hospital staff
responsible for the coding of the variable have a ﬁnancial incentive
to attribute DTOCs to shortfalls in social care to extract ﬁnancial
compensation from local authorities. Finally, individual-level data
about DTOCs have only been available for the NHS since 2013/14
and are characterised by extremely high levels of missing data.
Against this background, our study examines whether issues of
coordination between hospitals and LAs determine post-operative
lengths of stay for elderly individuals who  have undergone a proce-
dure (hip-replacement) and who  require care post-discharge. We
explicitly consider the hypothesis that as the number of LAs that a
single hospital site deals with increases, that hospital’s patients will
face longer discharge processes and greater post-operative lengths
of stay. Speciﬁcally, we test whether the post-operative length of
stay for patients who have undergone hip surgery is longer for those
patients discharged from hospitals who deal with a greater num-
ber of LAs or where the hospital faces a greater variability in the
number of LAs they discharge to. These hypotheses are motivated
by the expectation that hospitals ﬁnd it difﬁcult to develop efﬁ-
cient joint arrangements with LA social care departments when
having to discharge their patients to many and/or varying num-
bers of local authorities. We  expect the coordination of assessment
and service commissioning functions, in particular, will be more
complex and difﬁcult as they rely on close relationships between
J.-L. Fernandez et al. / Journal of Health Economics 61 (2018) 233–243 235
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aFig. 1. Number of Delayed Days during the reporting period, Acut
ource: NHS England, 2017.
ealth and social care front line workers and on a good understand-
ng of the local supply of care services for supporting individuals
ost-discharge. The number of and variation in the LAs a single
ospital deals with therefore proxy the increasing uncertainty and
omplexity arising from coordination of hospital and social care
rovision.
We  outline a queuing model to build our hypotheses about the
elationship between numbers and variation in local authorities
nd post-operative lengths of stay. This queuing model and our
mpirical strategies are outlined in Section 2. Section 3 provides
iscussion of the data, while Section 4 presents the results. This is
ollowed by a set of conclusions in Section 5.
. Model and empirical speciﬁcation
We  outline a queuing model to motivate our contention that
ncreases in the number of LAs and in the variation in the number
f LAs being dealt with by a single hospital lead to longer time
o discharge. We  provide our motivation by drawing on Gaughin
t al. (2015) who proposed a model of time from hospital discharge
o nursing home as a Markov queuing model, deﬁned in queueing
erms as M/M/1.1 That is, a Markov model where patients ready
o be discharged followed a Poisson distribution with a given mean
ate or discharge time to a single server for each discharged patient.
n our case, we are dealing with a similar but slightly more general
nd complex problem characterised as an M/G/1 queuing system.
The time to discharge is our focus of interest. We  retain a Pois-
on arrival rate of potentially dischargeable patients (the M arrival
tream). Each LA provides a variety of community and institutional
are packages, where these social care packages are the bundles
f speciﬁc services to be produced and delivered to each individ-
al upon discharge. The LA servicing “rate” relates to a process
hich includes the assessment and identiﬁcation of the needs of
ndividual patients, the design of the appropriate care package, the
ommissioning of the care and the actual delivery of the services.
his process varies across individuals within each LA and is there-
ore better represented by an (unknown) distribution, (deﬁned as
). The service rate is therefore stochastic, and of unknown dis-
1 This is conventional notation for a queuing model based on the arrival stream
M),  the service times (M)  and the number of servers; M/M/1 denotes Poisson
rrivals, exponential service times and a single server).Non-Acute, for NHS Organisations in England by reason for delay.
tribution, to better represent the different care service times. This
generalises the queuing model for hospital discharge to LA care as
an M/G/1 system to reﬂect that queuing depends on both the arrival
rate of potentially dischargeable patients and the LA throughput
(“servicing”) of any given patient which is subject to variation
around an average service time, as represented by the (unknown)
distribution (G). Note also that the number of LAs (“servers” in
queuing literature terms) for any given potentially dischargeable
patient is 1. While any given hospital simultaneously discharges
to a number of different LAs (“servers”), each patient awaiting dis-
charge has to go to the particular LA in which that patient resides.
That is, there is only 1 LA allocated to each potentially dischargeable
patient.
We can use this formulation of queuing to show that, as the
servicing times of any LA are independent across individual patients
and represented by an unknown distribution (G), times to discharge
increase as hospitals deal with greater numbers of LAs. We  can
also show that time to discharge increases as the variation in LA
servicing times grow at the individual LA level, and that variation in
the number of LAs any given hospital transacts with is also likely to
increase discharge times. We  use these ﬁndings to aid speciﬁcation
of our empirical model.
To do so, let us deﬁne generally the mean care service provision
rate as E() and the variance in this service provision rate within the
LA as 2, as drawn from this unknown distribution (G). The rate of
servicing required to be provided by the given LA in any given time
period is then  = E(). This is essentially the average utilisation
rate of any given LAs capacity to process patients through needs-
assessment to the appropriate care service package and secure and
deliver that care.
Deﬁning the average number of potential patients waiting to be
discharged as E(Lq) then the average time to discharge for these
patients E(W) is given as:
E(W) = E(Lq)E() + E(R) (1)
where the ﬁrst term is the mean time required to service those
due to be discharged to LAs (which includes the patients needs
assessment, the design of the package, the commissioning of the
care and the actual delivery of the service) and the second term is
the time to complete the discharge process of those already in the
process of being discharged to the LA system, with E(R) deﬁning the
remaining (residual) servicing time of those individuals.
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transition probabilities attached to each state. We  can then exam-
ine explicitly the implied transition intensities associated with
hospital discharge, as deﬁned by the Markov process underlying
the queuing model.3 Focusing on the discharge probabilities we  can
2 Feldman and Whitt (1998) are explicitly concerned with long-tailed distribu-
tions, which we  can presume will apply to a degree in our case. Certainly as delayed
discharges grow the tail of the distribution will grow. In fact the coefﬁcient of varia-
tion will equal 1 in such distributions but only for the trivial case where the service
rates are always equal across LAs.36 J.-L. Fernandez et al. / Journal of 
We  want to show that the expected time of potentially dis-
hargeable patients to discharge, E(W), depends on both the mean
ervice provision rate, E(), and the variance in this provision rate,
2. Use of Little’s Law (Little, 1961) allows us to deﬁne the numbers
aiting to be discharged in terms of the “arrival” rate of potentially
ischargeable patients and the average wait for discharge:
(Lq) = E(W)  (2)
Combining (1) and (2) gives:
(W) = E(R)
1 −  (3)
hich is commonly referred to as the Pollaczek–Khinchin mean
alue formula (see Grimmett and Stirzaker, 1982). It can also be
hown (Grimmett and Stirzaker, 1982) that E(R) can be written as:
(R) = E(
2)
2E()
= 
2
 + E()2
2E()
= 1
2
(cv2 + 1)E() (4)
So (3) becomes:
(W) = 
1
2 (cv
2
 + 1)E()
1 −  (5)
here cv2 is the square of the coefﬁcient of variation relating to
he unknown LA care service provision rate distribution (G).
From (3)–(5) it can be seen that the mean time to discharge of
otentially dischargeable patients depends on any given LA’s mean
ervice processing and delivery time and the variation around their
ean service processing and delivery time. In other words, if a hos-
ital is facing 2 LAs and therefore two (M/G/1) queuing systems,
here both LAs have the same arrival rate of potential patients
aiting to be discharged and average social care processing and
ervice rates, if one LA has a higher variance in this processing and
ervice rate their patients will experience a higher mean queue size
nd delay to discharge.
Noting that  = E() we can re-write (5) as:
(W) = E(
2)
2(1 − ) (6)
nd expressing E(2) in terms of cv2 the expected time to discharge
an be written as:
(W) = (1 + cv
2
)
2E()(1 − ) (7)
This clearly shows that, holding all other parameters of the
ueuing model constant, the mean time to discharge increases lin-
arly in cv2 at a rate

2E()(1−) . In other words, the impact of cv
2

n lengthening discharge time is magniﬁed as , the LA processing
nd care package delivery rate, increases.
The types of social care provided by the LA and the demand
cross individuals for any given type of care are of course liable
o differ, as captured by G. This, coupled with the fact that any
iven potentially dischargeable hospital patient must be served
y their LA of residence means that the time and resource costs
f processing discharges will vary by LA and individual patient.
hile different hospitals will behave differently, the clear impli-
ation is that increasing the transactions across LAs will tend to
ead to increasing discharge times. We  now give some rationale for
his assumption.
Any given hospital needs to coordinate patient discharges with
 number of LAs. From a single hospital’s perspective, the overall
verage time to discharge, E(WH), across all its potentially dis-
hargeable patients will be a mixture distribution, deﬁned as a
eighted sum of the underlying independent distributions deﬁn-
ng the discharge times to each LA this hospital is transacting with; Economics 61 (2018) 233–243
that is, a weighted sum of each of the E(W) deﬁned above. As such,
the average discharge time at the hospital level will be deﬁned as:
E(WH) =
N∑
i=1
wiE(Wi) (8)
where the wi are (non-random) weights (wi ≥ 0 and
∑
wi = 1)
attached to each of the underlying (single LA) discharge time dis-
tributions and the E(Wi) are the average discharge times of the
patients from each hospital being discharged to a given LA i. It seems
reasonable to assume that the wi reﬂect the proportion of patients
being discharged by a single hospital to any given LA. Depending
on the processing and servicing times any given hospital experi-
ences with any individual LA, it may  be that a hospital’s discharge
time increases or decreases as the number of LAs it coordinates
with increases. This gives rise to a testable proposition that hos-
pital discharge times are, as we  might expect, a function of the
number of LAs any single hospital deals with. We  pursue this empir-
ically below by testing whether discharge times increase with the
variation in the number of LAs a hospital transacts with.
The variance of the mixture distribution, 2WH , deﬁning the
average discharge time for each individual hospital is:
2WH =
N∑
i=1
wi((E(Wi) − E(WH))
2 + 2i ) (9)
Eq. (9) incorporates both the dispersion of mean discharge times
of the individual LAs expected discharge time relative to the over-
all (mixture) mean discharge time and the individual variation
around each, given each LAs expected discharge time that a hospi-
tal transacts with. Feldmann and Whitt (1998) show that mixture
distributions derived from underlying M/G/1 models can be mod-
elled in approximation as a hyperexponential distribution. Such
distributions have a number of properties, including the fact that
their coefﬁcients of variation are always greater than 1.2 We  would
expect given (9) above and the observation that mixture models
based on an M/G/1 queue can be associated with coefﬁcients of
variation greater than 1, that hospitals transacting across increasing
number of LAs will face increasing variation in expected discharge
times.
In other words, our heuristic model of the discharge process
implies that the time to discharge within any given hospital will be a
function of the number of LAs a single hospital transacts with. Based
on the reasonable assumption that processing and coordination
times will increase as the number of LAs a given hospital transacts
with increases and as the variation in the number of LAs a hospital
transacts with ﬂuctuates over time, then we might expect the dis-
charge time for that hospital’s potentially dischargeable patients to
increase also.
Assuming time to discharge to be a random process, the dis-
charge queueing model can be speciﬁed as a count process with3 Focus on transition probabilities and hazards also adds more information in the
modelling of the data through incorporation of time to the event (time to discharge
in  our case) which a simple Poisson regression, for example, does not. Moreover, the
Poisson model, with a split at each unique discharge time, is in fact equivalent to a
Cox model, but such a Poisson speciﬁcation eats degrees of freedom (Royston and
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pecify an empirical model based on either a single discharge risk or
 set of competing risks of discharge. Single discharge destinations
eem reasonable if we assume that at any point in time individu-
ls face either discharge or remaining in hospital, with the latter
ncompassing death within hospital. Empirically, we test whether
he probability of discharge decreases, implying the time to dis-
harge increases, with the number of LAs a hospital contracts with
nd with the variation in the number of LAs a hospital coordinates
ith over time. Specifying a single discharge hazard will capture
his decreasing hospital-LA discharge effect. If on the other hand,
t is believed that all hospital discharges are affected by decreasing
robabilities of discharge as a hospital negotiates with increasing
umbers of LAs, but that different discharge destinations affect
he underlying discharge probabilities of an individual being dis-
harged at any point in time differently, then a competing risk
odel would seem more appropriate.
For the single discharge destination model we  adopt a ﬂex-
ble parametric survival model approach, based on the set of
oyston–Parmar estimators (Royston, 2002). These parametric
odels are useful as they allow ﬂexibility in the speciﬁcation of
he underlying hazard function, (and consequently the survival
unction), through smoothing a baseline cumulative hazard func-
ion across a number of linear splines. Speciﬁcally, they are not
estricted to a single distributional assumption and do not rely on
on-proportionality to be imposed. Moreover, they easily incorpo-
ate covariates into the speciﬁcation. These estimators are therefore
 more ﬂexible form of speciﬁcation than the commonly used (but
ore restrictive) Cox proportional hazards model. Royston and
armar (2002) outline the generalisability of the approach through
ransformation of the survival function by a link function g(·) such
hat
{S(t : z)} = g(S0(t)}ˇ′z
here S0(t) = S(t;0) is the baseline survival function and  ˇ are
arameters to be estimated for a set of covariates z. The approach is
o model the logarithm of the baseline cumulative hazard function
ssociated with S(t;z), as a cubic spline function of log time (Roys-
on, 2002). Cubic spline functions are used to generalise the shape
f the survival function. Natural cubic splines may  be approximated
y linear splines through imposing boundary knots and a number
f internal knots to deﬁne the linear splines. Spline complexity is
etermined by the number of degrees of freedom (df), which deter-
ines the maximum number of internal knots4. Actual ﬁtting of the
plines can be achieved parsimoniously through comparison of the
kaike information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1998) and the Bayes
nformation criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978).
For the alternative competing risks model of hospital discharge,
e consider an individual who has had surgery and denote the
uration of hospital stay after surgery by t and consider three mutu-
lly exclusive discharge destinations: discharge to usual place of
esidence (incorporating any community-based social care), dis-
harge to nursing home or discharge to residential home. Let
r = 1 be discharged to destination r, and 0 otherwise. We  model
he instantaneous probability, (t), that an individual will be dis-
ambert, 2011). Both the Poisson and the Cox models assume proportional hazards,
ence our preference for the more general Royston–Parmar models.
4 Deﬁning x = ln(t) we can deﬁne the survival function through a function s(x),
ased on the log of time, which is approximated by a spline. Deﬁning the boundary
nots as kmin , kmax , if m internal knots are deﬁned within these boundaries, such that
1 < · · · < km with k1 > kmin and km < kmax then the natural cubic spline can be written
s s(x) = 0 + 1x + 21(x) + · · · + m+11(x) where the jth function of  is deﬁned for
 = 1, . . .,  m as vj(x) = (x − kj)3+ − j(x − kmin)
3
+ − (1 − )(x − kmax)3+ and j =
kmax−kj
kmax−kmin
nd (x − ˛)3+ = max{0, (x − ˛)3}. Economics 61 (2018) 233–243 237
charged at time t given that they have survived in hospital until
time t, to destination r as:
r(t) = lim
ıt→|0
Pr(t  < T  t + ır = 1|T  t)
ıt
We model these competing risks using an estimation method
proposed by Wei  (1989) and Lin (1994) which deﬁnes marginal
probabilities.
We also empirically test the implications of our conceptual
model by ﬁtting a Poisson regression. We  do so as a robustness
check, given that more information is provided through the time
to discharge speciﬁcation, but to ensure the basic empirical results
still hold in a simpler speciﬁcation. Note, however, that as the Pois-
son speciﬁcation models counts of days in hospital, while the time
to discharge models are based on probabilities of discharge, we
expect parameters to be of opposite sign in the two speciﬁcations.
3. Data
We use data on hospital discharge collected on an administra-
tive database by the NHS Health Care and Social Care Information
Centre (HCSIC) for the years 2002 to 2013 for patients who have
undergone elective hip surgery. Hip surgery is a useful marker con-
dition used to examine health and social care quality for frail and
older patients (Boulton et al., 2016). We  concentrate on patients
over 75 years of age as they are at most risk of needing LA social
care following hospital discharge. We  further restrict our sample
to patients from larger hospitals, with admissions greater than 150
per year, to purge small numbers and as this is where delayed
discharges are assumed to be most problematic. After dropping
cases seemingly aged greater than 115 years or who  had missing
confounding variable data this provides complete data on 171,979
elderly patients aged 75 and above during this period.
Given the limitations discussed above of DTOC indicators in the
NHS, our empirical model examines variations in post-operative
length of stay, a measure which combines the time that a patient
takes to recover from the intervention (in our case a hip operation)
and the subsequent period of time that the patient spends in hos-
pital until he/she is discharged. Variations in post-operative length
of stay reﬂect therefore both differences between patients’ needs
and differences in the time it takes to organise the discharge of the
patient once he/she has recuperated enough from the intervention.
In the empirical model, we control for patient need by focusing on a
homogenous intervention (hip operations) for speciﬁc age groups,
and by including indicators of age, gender, comorbidity, number of
diagnoses and count of procedures and speciﬁc indicators of com-
plexity (whether the patient suffered a fractured hip, presence of an
open wound, urinary tract infection and pulmonary embolism) and
of socioeconomic deprivation of the patient’s place of residence. We
also control for the type of hip replacement carried out (cemented
or uncemented) and for potential systematic differences in patient
needs between hospitals (e.g. due to targeting effects) through hos-
pital trust and treatment centre ﬁxed effects, and by focusing on
hospitals with more than 150 admissions per year.
Our dependent variable returns, for any individual, the proba-
bility (hazard) of being discharged at any point in time after having
an operation, conditioned on still being in hospital up to that point
in time. We  account for confounding inﬂuences to allow us to test
our hypothesis that, in accordance with the queueing model out-
lined above, hospital discharge time is a function of the number
of LAs an individual hospital transacts with. We use counts of the
number of LAs any one hospital discharges hip patients to during
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Fig. 2. Distribution across the patients in the sample of the number of local author-
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Fig. 3. Average daily hip discharges per month per site.
ties that the hospital site discharged patients to on the month the patient was
ischarged.
ach month as a proxy for this coordination cost.5 We  also explic-
tly test whether the variability in the number of LAs that a hospital
oordinates their discharge processes with is associated with time
o discharge. We  do so by deﬁning a proxy variable based on the
ariation (standard deviation) in the number of LAs any one hospi-
al discharges to (and therefore coordinates with) over the period
f observation in the data, averaged over a month.
The probability of discharge is conditioned on a set of confound-
ng factors that systematically determine hospital discharge. As
ell as the set of patient characteristics mentioned above, a number
f hospital characteristics (teaching status, whether a Foundation
rust; as the latter have more autonomous management), and vari-
bles indicating day of discharge, total number of hip operations
erformed at each hospital per annum, the average waiting time
or hip surgery at each site, the average number of hip replacement
ischarges per month at each hospital site and the average yearly
ccupancy rate of the hospital trust were included in the models.
Table 1 gives descriptive details of these data. The mean age of
ur population is 80 (noting we are only interested in individuals
5 and above) and most are female. The level of comorbidities, on
verage, is low while most individuals come from a relatively non-
eprived background.6 As noted, we are particularly interested in
he number of LAs a single hospital deals with in any given period
nd the variation in this number of LAs over any given period. On
verage, hospitals deal with approximately 4 LAs per month in dis-
harging hip patients, although with considerable variation. Fig. 2
eports the distribution of average number of LAs any single hos-
ital site deals with in a given month for our sample of patients.
s can be readily seen, this is very skewed, with the vast majority
f patients being discharged from hospitals dealing with less than
0 LAs on a given month, but a few from hospitals dealing with
onsiderably more LAs.
To give some context, we also show in Fig. 3 the average daily
umber of hip related discharges per hospital site for our sample
f discharged patients. The ﬁgure shows a signiﬁcant right skew in
he distribution, with the large majority of discharges in the sam-
5 Month was chosen as the appropriate unit of time for counting local authorities
nvolved in discharge processes, as daily or even weekly counts did not allow the
ariation in local authority numbers to be assessed adequately.
6 The deprivation score is base on an index of deprivation calculated at a small
rea level covering over 32,000 geographical areas within England, and across seven
omains; income, employment, health deprivation and disability, education, bar-
iers to housing, crime and living environment. The area of greatest deprivation is
anked 1 and area of least deprivation 32,482. Individuals are assigned, anonymously
y postcode to the relevant area and consequently deprivation ranking.Fig. 4. Distribution of Std Dev of number of local authorities per site per month.
ple taking place in hospitals dealing with fewer than 2 discharges
per day (averaged on a given month). Finally, Fig. 4 reports on the
variation (standard deviation) in the number of LAs a given hospital
site deals with per month over the whole time-period covered by
the data. The ﬁgure indicates considerable variation in the levels
of volatility in the number of LAs that hospitals discharge patients
to, with the vast majority of discharges in the data taking place in
hospitals sites with less than 2 standard deviations in the number
of LAs over the period observed in the data. Overall, 368 hospital
sites and 165 hospital trusts are included in the analysis.
4. Results
Table 2 presents the main estimates from our empirical analysis
based on the Royston–Parmar and competing risks speciﬁcations
given above. The Royston–Parmar models were run with different
numbers of splines applied and tested through the use of the AIC
and BIC information criteria. In the event, the coefﬁcient values did
not change by much over a range of spline values. Therefore, in trad-
ing off parsimony with number of splines, we selected the smallest
number of splines which thereafter only minimally affected the AIC
and BIC values. This suggested 4 splines.7
For the Royston–Parmar models we  provided 3 sets of estimates,
including and excluding hospital trust and LA ﬁxed effects, for the
7 The results were not affected when the speciﬁcations were run with 2, 3 or 5
splines.
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Table  1
Descriptive statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Age at discharge 80.062 4.109 75 103
Gender: female 0.667 0.471 0 1
Charlson: commorbidity index 1.368 2.229 0 6
Count  of diagnoses 3.670 2.349 1 20
Count  of procedures 2.475 1.087 1 24
Hip  replacement cemented 0.464 0.294 0 1
Hip  replacement uncemented 0.219 0.226 0 1
Hip  fracture 0.179 0.383 0 1
Open  wound 0.006 0.077 0 1
Urinary tract infection 1.135 0.812 0.032 4.724
Pulmonary embolism 0.0003 0.018 0 1
Local  deprivation index 0.119 0.093 0 0.96
Foundation trust 0.558 0.497 0 1
Hospital is treatment centre 0.039 0.194 0 1
Number of LAs patients are discharged to per site per month 4.178 3.921 1 35
Volatility LAs: Std Dev of number of LAs per site per month 1.205 0.693 0 4.637
Total  yearly number of hip discharges at site 399.586 279.304 1 1355
Occupancy rate hospital trust 84.303 5.826 42.323 98.401
Monthly average waiting time for hip operations (days) 133.021 65.843 1 660
Average daily discharges per site 0.048 0.010 0.032 4.724
LA  care home beds (per population 65 plus) 1.135 0.010 0.008 0.082
Discharge day: Sunday 0.017 0.130 0 1
Discharge day: Monday 0.170 0.375 0 1
Discharge day: Tuesday 0.194 0.396 0 1
Discharge day: Wednesday 0.194 0.396 0 1
Discharge day: Thursday 0.197 0.398 0 1
Discharge day: Friday 0.177 0.381 0 1
Number of observations: 171,979
Table 2
Main results.
R-P estimates; >74
Trust and LA FEs
R-P estimates; >74
Trust FEs
R-P estimates; >74
LA FEs
Competing Risks; >74
No Trust or LA FEs
Coeff. OR Z Coeff. OR Z Coeff. OR Z Coeff. OR Z
Age at discharge −0.119*** 0.888 (−91.17) −0.119*** 0.888 (−89.82) −0.117*** 0.890 (−91.61) −0.0584*** 0.943 (−95.26)
Gender: female −0.370*** 0.691 (−36.86) −0.369*** 0.691 (−36.63) −0.361*** 0.697 (−36.31) −0.156*** 0.856 (−29.40)
Charlson index −0.0131*** 0.987 (−5.56) −0.0131*** 0.987 (−5.57) −0.0111*** 0.989 (−4.77) −0.00556*** 0.994 (−4.39)
Count  of diagnoses −0.165*** 0.848 (−63.01) −0.164*** 0.849 (−62.57) −0.152*** 0.859 (−60.24) −0.0670*** 0.935 (−53.39)
Count  of procedures −0.316*** 0.729 (−62.60) −0.316*** 0.729 (−62.25) −0.315*** 0.730 (−64.15) −0.130*** 0.878 (−58.29)
Cemented −0.627*** 0.534 (−33.40) −0.627*** 0.534 (−33.43) −0.505*** 0.603 (−29.71) −0.169*** 0.845 (−19.23)
Uncemented 0.182*** 1.200 (6.27) 0.178*** 1.195 (6.16) 0.0611** 1.063 (2.54) 0.00816 1.008 (0.64)
Hip  fracture −0.613*** 0.542 (−7.74) −0.612*** 0.542 (−7.73) −0.599*** 0.549 (−7.67) −0.277*** 0.758 (−6.21)
Open  wound −1.794*** 0.166 (−28.44) −1.794*** 0.166 (−28.32) −1.818*** 0.162 (−29.11) −0.567*** 0.567 (−24.95)
UTI  −1.070*** 0.343 (−25.65) −1.067*** 0.344 (−25.55) −1.070*** 0.343 (−25.92) −0.388*** 0.678 (−20.95)
Embolism −0.913*** 0.401 (−3.33) −0.895*** 0.409 (−3.26) −0.867*** 0.420 (−3.18) −0.301** 0.740 (−2.55)
Local  deprivation −0.710*** 0.492 (−12.84) −0.726*** 0.484 (−13.84) −0.690*** 0.502 (−12.68) −0.483*** 0.617 (−18.63)
Foundation trust 0.769*** 2.158 (5.32) 0.975*** 2.650 (10.57) 0.137*** 1.147 (10.83) 0.0307*** 1.031 (6.12)
Treatment centre 0.194*** 1.214 (4.61) 0.193*** 1.213 (4.70) 0.310*** 1.363 (10.42) 0.138*** 1.148 (9.14)
LAs  per month −0.0102*** 0.990 (−2.73) −0.0100*** 0.990 (−2.71) −0.0378*** 0.963 (−12.98) −0.0196*** 0.981 (−13.95)
Volatility LAs −0.196*** 0.822 (−6.35) −0.192*** 0.825 (−6.34) −0.132*** 0.876 (−8.29) −0.0415*** 0.959 (−5.94)
Nb  hips per year 0.00152*** 1.002 (22.66) 0.00152*** 1.002 (22.68) 0.000191*** 1.000 (3.66) 0.0000301 1.000 (1.10)
Occupancy rate 0.00276** 1.003 (2.18) 0.00279** 1.003 (2.20) 0.00212** 1.002 (2.19) 0.00152*** 1.002 (3.46)
Waiting time site −0.00969*** 0.990 (−90.81) −0.00973*** 0.990 (−89.16) −0.00997*** 0.990 (−98.33) −0.00404*** 0.996 (−99.18)
Average daily disch 0.128*** 1.136 (7.21) 0.128*** 1.136 (7.22) 0.185*** 1.203 (10.73) 0.0934*** 1.098 (9.75)
Sunday −0.377*** 0.686 (−9.32) −0.379*** 0.685 (−9.37) −0.371*** 0.690 (−9.25) −0.158*** 0.854 (−7.24)
Monday −0.304*** 0.738 (−13.22) −0.302*** 0.739 (−13.17) −0.288*** 0.750 (−12.63) −0.0973*** 0.907 (−7.28)
Tuesday −0.403*** 0.668 (−17.76) −0.403*** 0.669 (−17.75) −0.388*** 0.678 (−17.27) −0.111*** 0.895 (−8.47)
Wednesday −0.386*** 0.680 (−17.04) −0.384*** 0.681 (−16.95) −0.347*** 0.707 (−15.48) −0.0944*** 0.910 (−7.17)
Thursday −0.346*** 0.707 (−15.38) −0.347*** 0.707 (−15.41) −0.331*** 0.718 (−14.84) −0.106*** 0.899 (−8.04)
Friday  −0.201*** 0.818 (−8.83) −0.200*** 0.819 (−8.81) −0.194*** 0.823 (−8.61) −0.0491*** 0.952 (−3.67)
Constant 12.58*** (23.12) 12.58*** (66.96) 12.16*** (24.02)
(N)  171,979 171,979 171,979 171,979
t statistics in parentheses.
*
p
p
c p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.opulation over 75 year old. We  specify ﬁxed effects at the hos-
ital trust level (rather than at the hospital site level) in order to
ontrol for general (but unobservable) trust management charac-teristics, while still capturing hospital site level discharge processes
through our proxies; the number of LAs dealt with and the volatil-
ity measure. Discharges are managed at the site, not trust level, so
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ur proxies capture the correct level of aggregation for discharge
ractice.8
Across all speciﬁcations the main coefﬁcients of interest, on
he variable giving the number of LAs any individual hospital dis-
harged individuals to (“LAs per month”) and on the variable giving
he variation in the number of LAs a hospital dealt with on aver-
ge each month within our period of observation (“Volatility LAs”),
emain similar in magnitude, negative and highly statistically sig-
iﬁcant. The exponentiated coefﬁcients on the Royston–Parmar
odels return odds ratios, which not surprisingly are signiﬁcant
cross all the speciﬁcations.9 The competing risks model returns
esults which support those of the Royston–Parmar model. The
esults indicate that as the number of LAs increased the likelihood
f being discharged on a given day, conditioned on a given post-
perative length of stay being reached, decreases. Similarly, as the
olatility (proxied by the standard deviation) in the number of LAs
n individual hospital coordinates with increases, the likelihood of
eing discharged decreases.10
Our preferred speciﬁcation, reported in the ﬁrst column of
able 2, includes ﬁxed effects on both hospital trust and LAs to cap-
ure unobserved heterogeneity. In this speciﬁcation the coefﬁcient
f −0.0102 returns an odds of being discharged of 0.990. Increasing
ariability in the number of LAs being dealt with, is associated with
 coefﬁcient of −0.196 and an odds ratio of 0.822. In other words,
s the variation in the number of LAs dealt with by a given hospital
ncreases by 1 standard deviation, the likelihood of discharge for
n elderly patient having a hip procedure falls by 0.178.
The other results returned from our core speciﬁcations are
lso meaningful and statistically signiﬁcant with the likelihood of
ost-operative discharge falling with increased patient need and
omplexity (age at discharge, number of co-morbidities, number
f diagnoses and procedures, presence of an open wound, urinary
ract infection and pulmonary embolism), and with the index of
eprivation of the area the patient has been admitted from. We
lso ﬁnd that the probability of discharge is lower if the patient is
emale. The size of the social deprivation effect might respond to
 combination of demand and supply-side factors. Socioeconomic
eprivation has been associated with multimorbidity that included
ental health disorders, and with greater prevalence of limiting
ong term illness, in particular in urban areas (Barnett et al., 2001,
012). The indicator might therefore control for unaccounted-for
eed-related factors. In addition, more deprived areas might be
aced with relatively more severe supply side constraints. We test
his within our robustness checks in Table 3, and ﬁnd that the
arge negative relationship between economic deprivation and the
robability of discharge remains even when residential care supply
ndicators are included in the model.
In terms of the hospital characteristics, Trust Foundation hos-
itals, which have more autonomous management practices than
ther hospitals, and treatment centres, which specialise on com-
on  elective surgery and diagnostic procedures, are associated
ith higher likelihood of post-operative discharge, as are hospi-
als that had a higher yearly volume of hip patients and higher
verage daily number of discharges in the month of discharge.
aken together, these results suggest that larger hospitals have bet-
er discharge practices, a ﬁnding that seems intuitive and possibly
eﬂects higher staff to patients ratios and better information man-
8 Hospital trusts may be spread across a number of sites. The discharge process is
enerally located at the site level. The ratio of hospital sites to hospital trusts in the
ata  is 2.2.
9 The odds ratios reported should be interpreted as the relative change in the
verage probability of discharge at any point in time across our sample associated
ith a one unit change in the indicator.
10 The calculated odds from the competing risks model is similar in magnitude to
hose returned by the Royston–Parmar models. Economics 61 (2018) 233–243
agement systems in such institutions. A hospital site with greater
occupancy rates had larger discharge probabilities, all else equal,
possibly reﬂecting capacity constraints. Having controlled for vol-
ume  of cases and occupancy rates, lower probabilities of discharge
are associated with higher waiting times for admission.
Although not reported here due to space constraints, our results
conﬁrm that the splines are parsimonious with our underlying time
to discharge data. The log of the transform variable used to impose
these linear restrictions is also signiﬁcant and the value (0.139)
indicates that a Cox proportional hazards model is not a good ﬁt to
the baseline hazard.11
Table 3 reports a number of robustness checks, including the
results of the competing risks and Poisson models. We report the
results of the various time to discharge models, before turning to
the Poisson. We are aware that, given data restrictions, we  cannot
fully control for supply-side effects. However, we do have data on
LA care home bed supply per older population for a sub-sample of
our period of analysis (2011–2013). The speciﬁcation including LA
care home beds retains hospital trust and LA ﬁxed effects. Results
are given in the ﬁrst column of Table 3, where it can be seen that
although the sample size is considerably reduced, the two  coef-
ﬁcients of interest (“LAs per month” and “Volatility LAs”) remain
negative and the latter retains statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%
level. Indeed, all the variables retain coefﬁcients of similar sign and
magnitude to those reported in Table 2. The additional variable,
picking up the inﬂuence of supply-side effects (“Care home beds”)
is positive and signiﬁcant, showing that higher local care home
bed supply, as expected, increases the likelihood of post-operative
discharge. The second and third columns in Table 3 report the inﬂu-
ence of the number of discharges a hospital deals with by sorting
our sample into hospitals dealing with small numbers of discharges,
less than 1 discharge per day (Table 3 column 2) and hospitals deal-
ing with greater numbers of discharges (more than 1 discharge per
day; column 3). In both cases, hospital trust and LA ﬁxed effects are
retained. In line with our theoretical model, the larger the number
of LAs a hospital deals with the greater is the negative impact on
post-operative discharge probabilities.
Table 3 also shows that for hospitals dealing with a low dis-
charge load, the sign on our coefﬁcient of interest (“LAs per month”)
is in fact switched, becoming positive although insigniﬁcant. For
the hospitals with larger discharge load, again in keeping with our
hypothesis, the coefﬁcient is both negative and signiﬁcant. The
coefﬁcient picking up variability in the numbers of LAs a hospi-
tal deals with is everywhere negative, but not always signiﬁcant.
When restricting the speciﬁcation to the very elderly (over 85 years
of age) the coefﬁcients are again negatively signed but not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, probably due to the drop in sample size. All other
variables retain their signs and magnitude in the robustness checks.
The Poisson regression results, noting that the signs on the coef-
ﬁcients are reversed as a result of this speciﬁcation, support the
ﬁndings of our time to discharge models. Overall, the extensive
robustness checks therefore support our hypotheses, just as our
main speciﬁcations did, that both the number of LAs a hospital deals
with and increasing the variability in the number of LAs a hospital
deals with decrease the likelihood of conditional discharge.11 Royston and Parmar (2002) generalise cumulative hazard function, in the
form ln[−lnS(t)] = ln[−lnS0(t)] + x  ˇ to g[S(t)] = g[S(t) + xˇ] where g is a monotonic
increasing function depending on the parameter . They go on to show, that under
speciﬁc transformation as  tends to 0 the Cox proportional hazards speciﬁcation
is  returned. Crudely, as ln  is positive and signiﬁcant this implies  is not equal
to  0, which would imply non-proportionality. Full table of results are available on
request.
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Table  3
Robustness checks.
R-P; >74s old R-P; >74 old R-P; >74 old R-P; >74 old R-P estimates; >84 Poisson; >74 old
Trust  and LA FEs Trust and LA FEs Trust and LA FEs Trust and LA FEs Trust and LA FEs Trust and LA FEs
LA  supply > 1 disch./day 1 disch./day 1 LA on average
Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff
Age at discharge -.1218938*** −.1163814*** −.1220025*** −.1187058*** −.1308936*** .0250368***
Gender: female −.4392929*** −.3568836*** −.3912961*** −.3701347*** −.2281225*** .0559684***
Charlson index −.0104011*** −.0127453*** −.0140218*** −.0130237*** −.014825** .0017836***
Count of diagnoses −.2316296*** −.1566623*** −.1809499*** −.1645738*** −.1588302*** .0412998***
Count of procedures −.34082*** −.3000509*** −.330245*** −.315797*** −.2980287*** .075726***
Cemented −.4917967*** −.4922013*** −.7617732*** −.6294831*** −.5856112*** .1157933***
Uncemented −.2152165*** .3461172*** −.113955** .1832461*** .1815869** −.0778965***
Hip fracture −.7473417*** −.5296144*** −.7127235*** −.6208864*** −.5206531*** .0751578***
Open wound −1.59379*** −1.816316*** −1.782245*** −1.793271*** −1.420153*** .398495***
UTI −1.088297*** −.9934323*** −1.198288*** −1.067298*** −1.046215*** .2175001***
Embolism −.6821642 −.6503281* −1.434372*** −.9097058*** −2.274523*** .1263756***
Local deprivation −.6374804*** −.5553851*** −.935306*** −.7111279*** −.7096423*** .1676499***
Foundation trust 1.087609*** .8156675*** .9682986*** .7660883*** .6250194 −.1706784***
Treatment centre .6177007*** .3457711*** .5244533*** .1919757*** .2545066** −.0421134***
LAs per month −.0100534 −.004471 −.0089363* −.0099782*** −.0215416** .0022511***
Volatility LAs −.1121397 −.2330639*** −.1136309 −.207738*** −.0255451 .0397061***
Nb hips per year .0003911*** .0022303*** .0014188*** .0014989*** .0011038*** −.0003586***
Occupancy rate −.0002593 .002792 .0013493 .0025823** −.0010878 −.0005668**
Waiting time site −.0018218*** −.0091715*** −.010159*** −.00972*** −.0085163*** .0019574***
Average daily disch .0685154** .1055246*** .1280968*** .1274907*** .1281471*** −.0220346***
LA care home beds 30.66764***
Sunday −.2909044*** −.4572312*** −.1920133*** −.3746129*** −.5435577*** .0820822***
Monday −.3145687*** −.3311697*** −.2492664*** −.3039912*** −.3997607*** .0658482***
Tuesday −.3862319*** −.4090366*** −.3650405*** −.402208*** −.4132085*** .076655***
Wednesday −.468752*** −.4014352*** −.345495*** −.3845735*** −.3279173*** .0752159***
Thursday −.4588319*** −.361774*** −.3052667*** −.3463889*** −.2830897*** .0756808***
Friday −.2576886*** −.1983473*** −.184181*** −.2004396*** −.183419*** .0420064***
Constant .1059066*** .1367946*** .1131574*** .1307605*** .2426472***
(N) 55,172 98,647 73,332 171,613 26,429 171,979
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. Conclusions
Given the emphasis on increasing efﬁciency through improv-
ng the integration of health and social care in the recent reforms
f the NHS in England, there has been remarkably little attention
o this topic in the economics literature. There are a small num-
er of studies that attempt to quantify the degree of substitution
hat exists across health and social care provision. The general ﬁnd-
ng being that, while there is a degree of substitution across these
orms of care, it is small in magnitude. There has been little explo-
ation, however, of the mechanisms that may  support or hinder
ntegration and lead to different levels of substitutability.
An obvious means of integrating care is to improve the coor-
ination of hospital discharge procedures, both through greater
vailability of adult social care, for example increasing home
elps, nursing and residential home beds, and through improved
oordination in the design and commissioning of this care. The
mportance of coordinating needs assessment and care planning
rocesses effectively is most acute at the points of transition
etween care systems, such as when patients with social care needs
re being discharged from hospital. If patients are better managed
ith respect to their social care support, quicker discharge ought
herefore to improve hospital throughput.
This paper provides evidence that coordination problems
etween hospital providers and LA social care departments, as
easured by the impact of hospitals transacting with increasing
umbers of and variation in LAs in discharging elderly patients,
o impose a real cost on the NHS. The analysis conﬁrms that
oordination and contracting issues between hospitals and LAs
re a major concern, as noted in the Public Accounts Committee
eport (2016/17) on delayed discharges. Our results suggest mod-est impacts on post-operative length of stay as the number of LAs
that hospital sites deal with increases, but a larger impact as the
variation in LAs dealt with increases.
Our empirical analysis allows us to quantify the impact on hospi-
tal use of the number of, and variability in, hospital-LA relationships
by using our results to predict their impact on post-operative
lengths of stay, holding other factors in the model constant. Taking
the impact of increasing numbers of LAs dealt with ﬁrst, within our
sample of elderly patient discharged after elective hip procedures,
hospital sites are observed to deal with 4 LAs per month on aver-
age. Using our preferred model (reported in the ﬁrst column within
Table 3 and incorporating hospital trust and local authority ﬁxed
effects), our estimates would suggest that a doubling in the aver-
age number of LAs that each hospital deals with (i.e. from 4 to 8),
would only lead to a 1% increase in post-operative length of stay.
The small magnitude of this effect implies that, for a given level of
volatility, hospitals are able to adapt their discharge processes over
the long-run to accommodate increasing numbers of partner LAs.
This ﬁnding is in line with the modest reduction in discharge times
achieved as the supply of care home beds increases within a given
locality reported by Gaughin et al. (2015).
The impact on post-operative length of stay that the increasing
variation in LAs dealt with by a hospital is signiﬁcantly larger. This
is important given that, as shown in Fig. 4 which considers elderly
hip patients alone, this variation may be considerable. Assuming
ﬁrst, that there is no variation in the number of LAs that a hospi-
tal deals with over the study period, (i.e. setting the indicator of
standard deviation in the number of local authorities to zero) the
model predicts (holding all other variables at their observed levels)
an average of 8.21 days of post-operative stay across the study sam-
ple. This “no variation baseline” post-operative length of stay can
2 Health
t
a
h
i
t
a
o
d
v
t
c
(
p
a
v
t
w
a
o
p
£
s
e
r
t
I
t
c
s
t
d
s
t
T
t
p
t
d
c
t
r
e
t
t
r
o
c
d
n
o
m
a
s
i
o
a
f
r
t
a
p
o
a42 J.-L. Fernandez et al. / Journal of 
hen be compared with the post-operative stay predicted using the
verage observed level of variation in the number of LAs faced by
ospital sites in our sample. Continuing to hold all other variables
n the model constant, the average observed level of variability in
he number of LAs dealt with by each hospital in the sample is
ssociated with a predicted average post-operative length of stay
f 8.64 days. That is, approximately an additional half day (0.43
ays) in the discharge process for each patient relative to the “no
ariation baseline” level. We  can extrapolate this effect to quantify
he aggregate impact of variability in LA destination following dis-
harge on the wider NHS population. Applying the 0.43 extra days
the 8.64 minus 8.21 days) to the total 4.4 million per year hos-
ital admissions of over 75 year olds in England, would result in
n additional 1.9 million hospital days per year. A crude monetary
alue of these additional hospital days can be approximated using
he average excess bed-day cost for elective hip fracture patients
ith a single operative procedure, given by NHS Reference Costs
s £226.66 per patient in 2016/17. Per patient, the impact of the
bserved variability in LAs dealt with, through the impact of longer
ost-operative stay would therefore be on average an additional
111 per discharge, which aggregated across the total NHS admis-
ions for over 75s would correspond to £430 million per year. This
stimated additional 0.43 days in post-operative length of stay rep-
esents an average effect for all patients in the sample, including
hose that do not require any professional support post-discharge.
t is of course likely that signiﬁcantly longer delays will occur for
he more frail patients requiring signiﬁcant levels of formal social
are support post-discharge.
One means of attempting to quantify the impact on hospital sites
ubject to the greatest variations in the number of local authori-
ies they discharge patients to is to assume a level of 2 standard
eviations above the mean variation. Other factors being held con-
tant, this level of variation results in an additional 0.84 days added
o post-operative stay relative to the “no variation baseline” stay.
hat is, almost double the effect size. Our results suggest then,
hat hospitals appear to ﬁnd it increasingly challenging to put in
lace effective joint arrangements as they deal with greater varia-
ion in the number of local authorities with which they coordinate
ischarges through time. We  presume this reﬂects the increased
osts associated with setting-up appropriate and stable coordina-
ion systems and generally establishing strong inter-organizational
elationships, which have been recognized as critical for achieving
ffective care coordination (Bolland and Wilson, 1994).
While an obvious conclusion might be reached that to achieve
he necessary efﬁciency savings NHS hospitals should be incen-
ivised to deal with small number of LAs, such a policy would
equire a signiﬁcant reorganization of the geographical boundaries
f health and social care organizations in England, or unrealistic
hanges in the admission (as this dictates the LA the patient is
ischarged to) and discharge policies regarding the patient’s desti-
ation post-discharge. Moreover, our results emphasise the impact
f variability and thus suggest that a more productive strategy
ight concentrate on the streamlining of discharge procedures
nd processes, for instance through investment in information
haring systems covering patients care needs and the availabil-
ty of social care supply at the national level. The development
f national databases providing a “live” picture of care provider
vailability seems particularly important given the distribution of
actors associated with delayed hospital days reported in Fig. 1. Our
esults also beg the question of whether hospital payment struc-
ures in England should reﬂect the complexity of local discharge
rrangements, and speciﬁcally whether compensation should be
rovided to hospitals facing greater challenges in the coordination
f needs assessments, care planning and service commissioning
cross health and social care. Economics 61 (2018) 233–243
The full efﬁciency consequences of changes in post-operative
length of stay are unclear, however. For example, it is unlikely that
reductions would lead to hospital cost savings given existing wait-
ing lists, and further research is required to understand the full
cost implications for community health and social care services
of alternative discharge arrangements and associated throughput
decisions. Earlier discharges would require additional primary care
and LA resources. Whilst current UK policy initiatives are consider-
ing the resource consequences of these issues, the overall welfare
effects of different discharge arrangements remain undeﬁned.
There are three speciﬁc limitations worth considering when
drawing policy implications from our analysis. First, we recog-
nise that post-operative lengths of stay do not speciﬁcally measure
delays in the discharge process, although we  could expect post-
operative stays and delayed discharges to be strongly correlated. At
present, it is difﬁcult to quantify the degree of correlation or even
rely on the existing individual-level indicators of delayed transfers
of care in NHS hospitals because of the high levels of missing data,
problems with the reliability of the coding process and the lim-
ited time period for which they are available. Currently, therefore,
post-operative lengths of stay represent a more reliable indica-
tor for examining delayed discharges, but we recognise they are a
proxy. The second important feature of the analysis is the fact that
our analysis focusses on hip procedures. Although hip fractures are
commonly used as a marker condition for examining health and
social care quality for frail and older patients, it is clear that our
estimates do not represent the average effect across the whole pop-
ulation of older NHS acute care patients. Future analyses should
explore the impact of hospital site-local authority variability for
different health conditions, and in particular for non-elective pro-
cedures which are likely to involve greater complexity in the design
and implementation of post-discharge support plans. Finally, it is
worth reﬂecting on the nature of our indicators of coordination
complexity across health and social care organisations during the
hospital discharge process. Our results highlight the importance of
such complexities by using as proxies the number and variability
in the number of local authorities involved in the discharges from
hospital sites. Although our theoretical model provides a rationale
for the use of these indicators, and a clear set of hypotheses to be
tested empirically, further attention should be paid to the mea-
surement of coordination failures, and the relative importance of
speciﬁc problems in needs assessment, care planning and/or service
commissioning. The fact that we  ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects attributed
to the variables that we have used to proxy these complexities pro-
vides support to the importance of these issues in deﬁning hospital
and LA discharge relations.
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